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evidently the author does not mean it to be thus understood, for he regards it as inconsistent with evolution to hold that nature is a dead-level system and says there is no adequate reason to deny that the physical world rises to the level of purposive activity. But if purpose enters the natural world as a directing agency it must bring with it a type of relation different from, and in a sense contrary to, the externality of mere mechanism. The author recognizes none such, however; he says there is no valid reason to deny that consciousness is an extended manifold and proposes as a name for his theory "Neo-Materialism." Chapter IX. is the least valuable and interesting part of an excellent book.

HENRY WILKES WRIGHT.

LAKE FOREST COLLEGE.

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*The Problem of Personality.* ERNEST NORTHFIELD MERRINGTON.  
London: Macmillan and Company, Limited. 1916. Pp. 220.

An attempt to show that personality must be accepted as the initial datum from which we may proceed to a statement of the fundamental truths of philosophy and theology forms the subject-matter of this book. The first part of the work, which is devoted to an exposition and criticism of recent British and American writers in whose theories the concept of the self has occupied an important place, serves as the background with reference to which the constructive part of the treatment is concerned.

We pass immediately to the crucial point of the argument. The concept of experience has been dangerously vague. A scrutiny of this concept discloses the fact that the subject-object is the primary datum involved in all experience. The author lightly dismisses the difficulty in the position that if the subject-object be the initial assumption then the same reality must be ascribed to the object as to the subject. The subject, it is asserted, is the permanent center of reference for a shifting circumference of objects. Moreover, the subject is not limited in experience to cognition; the self which feels is as much the subject in experience as the knower. Self, person, consciousness, and kindred concepts are discovered to be various phases of the subject—"The one for whom any set of experiences is." By way of comment on this position we can only reiterate that argument which claims the advantage for experience or immediacy as the initial datum in philosophical theory. Here experience is used advisedly to denote that vague, indefinite, unanalyzed context upon which a later reflection operates in making the distinction of subject and object. The self as subject is held to be coexistential with the object, both being analytically evolved from an original complex.

With the reality of the self established the last chapters are occupied with the deduction of a metaphysic of existence, a metaphysic of values, and a metaphysic of reality. The reality of an absolute self is found to be implied in the reality of the self. This absolute self as a personality is derived from the nature of the subject as experiencing meaning or values. Finally, the worlds of "existence and of value upon which in distinction from each other I have laid so much stress, coalesce in the complete expression of divine purpose and of absolute value."

SAVILLA ALICE ELKUS.

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*Natural Rights: A Criticism of Some Political and Ethical Conceptions.* DAVID G. RITCHIE. Third edition. London: George Allen and Unwin. 1916. Pp. 300.

This book, first published in 1894 and now appearing without revision, shows inevitably the traces of controversies for the most part forgotten. On the other hand, not only are the general principles discussed of perennial interest, but in several instances particular problems are dealt with which are of present significance. Such, for example, is the consideration of the propriety of limiting the hours of work of railway employees, and of the extent to which liberty should be interfered with in the prevention of strikes.

The theoretical argument of the book is as follows: An appeal is made to natural rights when no legal basis can be found for the attainment of certain desired ends, or, more particularly, for the relief of what is felt to be oppression. The term "natural rights" is ambiguous. Of the various senses in which it has been used, the only legitimate one for political purposes is that of "the more fundamental rights which would be guaranteed by a society which was as it *ought* to be." The determination of the duty of society in this matter is based upon considerations of utility alone, and is relative to given circumstances. The greater part of the book is occupied with a discussion of particular "natural" rights, and is an illuminating commentary upon the difficulties of reconciling actual American practise (based upon utility) with American principles (based upon abstract and absolute rights).

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NEW YORK CITY.

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## JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, March, 1916. *Le rêve dans la littérature moderne* (pp. 209-274): Y. DELAGE. — The writer considers the use made of dreams in the writings of many nineteenth-century